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1.  Introduction 
The 1990s were a decade of financial distress. The turbulences within the EMS were followed 
by the Mexico crisis and the Tequilla effect. After that the Asian crisis struck with its 
repercussions felt strongly in Russia and most recently in Brazil. Over time the nature of the 
crises seems to have shifted somewhat. While the earlier crises were confined to the currency 
markets, the crises that struck the Asian tigers were not only currency crises but also the result 
of inefficient banking systems. 
Financial crises are usually quite expensive for the countries concerned. Just looking at the 
more recent ones, one is shaken by the numbers involved. The IMF has estimated that a 
typical currency crises causes output losses of about 4 – 7 percent of GDP and if currency 
crises occur together with banking crises this figures rises to 15 percent of GDP. (IMF, 
1998a) The experience of the Asian countries points in similar direction. Their drops in GDP 
during 1998 were drastic with a reduction of 14 percent in Indonesia, 7 percent in Thailand  
and 6 percent in Korea and Malaysia. Except for Korea all countries are estimated to 
experience further contractions in 1999. The decline in Russian GDP is of similar magnitude, 
shrinking by over 5 percent in the course of 1998 and an estimated 8 percent in 1999. (IMF 
1998b) Furthermore, the costs of restructuring the Thai banking sector have been estimated at 
20% of GDP (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998). 
It is clearly worthwhile to study the causes of financial crises and to try to understand the 
factors responsible for the dramatic downturns that seem to strike out at times unpredictably. 
It has been argued that herding behavior and self fulfilling attacks were largely responsible for 
the crises (Wyplosz 1998). The theoretical and empirical literature has demonstrated that 
spillover effects and irrationalities indeed are among the factors that help explain the 
occurrence of currency crises (Eichengreen, Rose and Wypolsz (1996), Frankel and Rose 
(1996), Obstfeld (1994)).  Other recent  empirical research that traces the evolution of 
different economic variables over time, indicates however that crisis do not just happen to 
countries, rather they are usually and foremost the result of unfavorable developments in the 
fundamentals of an economy. These deteriorating fundamentals typically “signal” long before 
the crisis that something is seriously amiss in the economic situation of a particular country. 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), Kaminsky (1998)) Furthermore, this research postulates that 
since financial liberalization has become more widespread a close link between balance of 
payments crises and banking crises  - the so called twin crises  - has developed. Thus 
knowledge about fragility in the banking sector can help to identify common causes and to 
prevent the outbreak of a balance of payments crisis. 
This paper applies the signals approach developed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996)  for the 
first time to selected transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. The countries which 
we focus on are Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. For each of 
those countries it is possible to identify the occurrence of a balance of payments crisis and a 
banking crisis since the onset of transition. The aims of the paper are twofold. First, we study 




whether the crises possessed a similar macroeconomic background and to identify the best 
leading indicators, which are of interest in assessing the development of economic variables in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Second, on a much more tentative note, we look at the individual 
countries and the evolution of the indicators before and after the time of crisis in order to 
highlight areas of concern for the countries involved. Our main results can be summarized as 
follows: 
First, on a fundamental level, this approach can be sensibly applied to the transition economies 
in spite of their remaining singularities. 
Second, all of the crises studied were characterized by a deterioration of economic 
fundamentals well ahead of the outbreak of the crises. Thus, spillovers and contagion seemed 
to have played a minor role at best. 
Third, the best indicators for predicting a crisis were the exports, the real exchange rate and in 
contrast to other studies the budget deficit. Of little value were imports, capital flight and the 
domestic real interest rate. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews the empirical 
literature on currency and banking crises. Basically this involves a discussion of the more 
traditional approach of estimating the likelihood of a crisis taking place and the presentation of 
the signals approach. Section three applies the signals approach to the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and discusses the resulting fit of the indicators. Section four looks at the 
countries in more detail and discusses the evolution of the indicators after the passing of the 
crises. Section five concludes. 
2.  The empirical literature 
2.1  Overview 
Even though empirical studies on balance of payments problems have been conducted for a 
fairly long time, they have rose to prominence only since the mid-80s. Until today numerous 
studies have been carried out that seek to establish the influence of different economic 
variables on the outbreak and development of currency crises (e.g, Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1996), Frankel and Rose (1996)).1 The possible interdependencies of currency and 
banking crises constitute a relatively new topic in this strand of literature, but one that has 
received heightened interest since the outbreak of the Asian crisis. Still, studies that deal with 
both balance of payments and banking crises are relatively rare yet.2 The groundbreaking 
work was conducted by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), who asked themselves the question 
causality behind the two crises, i.e. if one of the crises causes the other or whether both crises 
have common causes and similar variables can be identified as being the driving forces. Their 
                                                 
1  A good summary is found in Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997). 
2  A little more has been written on the theoretical interactions between the crises, see e.g. Valesco (1987) 




conclusion is that even though the two crises were unrelated until quite recently, they have 
tended to display a common background since capital controls have been abolished in earnest 
beginning  in the early 1980s. Typically a banking crises will precede a balance of payments 
crisis, but will reach its climax only after the balance of payments crisis has erupted. 
Studies dealing with the identification of early warning indicators differ widely in their scope, 
with some studies analyzing events over a time horizon of thirty years, while others focus on 
the events of one particular year. Similar disparity exist in view to the number of countries 
examined, sample groups of over 100 countries coexist with one country analysis. On the 
whole developing countries are included more often than industrialized countries. Data can be 
annual, quarterly or monthly. 
Another important difference of the different studies lies in the definition of what actually 
constitutes a crisis. Balance of payments crises are usually associated with devaluations, but no 
accepted measure of the necessary size for a devaluation to constitute a crisis exists. (see e.g. 
Frankel and Rose (1996) Goldfajn and Valdez (1998) and JP Morgan (1998)). Building on 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) several recent studies also include changes in reserves 
and interest rates, as realignments or changes in the exchange rate regime capture attacks on a 
currency only imperfectly. To capture the occurrence of a crisis an index can be constructed 
which weighs changes in the three variables. In case of a successful attack the currency 
devalues, but in other cases typically interest rates will be raised and/or reserves be sold. 
According to this measure a crisis has taken place if the index takes on values lying a specified 
number of standard deviations above its mean, otherwise the period is identified as tranquil. 
Banking crises are usually associated with events or states such as bank runs, closures, a 
certain share of non-performing loans or a recapitalization program. As they are usually much 
longer in duration than balance of payments crises two distinctions are made. The beginning of 
crisis is identified with a special occurrence like the closure of a bank or the granting of public 
financial assistance to the banking system. The climax of the crisis is that point in time when the 
largest number of bank are shut down or the government pledges its largest assistance – i.e. 
recapitalization – program. 
The largest variance between studies occurs with respect to the variables used to monitor the 
development in the balance of payments or in the banking sector. Typically this choice is 
dictated by data availability. In their comprehensive overview Kaminsky, Lizondo and 
Reinhart (1997) identified 103 different variables used in studies, however many of these are 
transformations of the same basic variables. 
2.2  The traditional approach: Estimating the probability of a crisis 
Two alternative approaches exist  for the systematic identification of early warning indicators. 
The first approach has traditionally focussed on balance of payments crises and tries to 
econometrically identify the roots and causes of currency crises. It was pioneered in a study 
dealing with Mexico by Blanco and Garber (1986). Following this approach Moreno (1995) 




conducted a comprehensive study of 105 developing countries, while Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1995, 1996) analyzed spillover effects among 20 industrial countries and Sachs, 
Tornell and Valesco (1996) sought to explain the tequilla effect. More recently, Kruger, 
Osakwe and Page (1998) in a study comprised of 19 developing countries tried to determine 
whether currency crises are typically due to shifts in the fundamentals or the result of spillover 
among the countries. On the (even more) practical side JP Morgan (1998) used these models 
to construct the socalled Event Risk Indicator (ERI), which it uses to predict currency crises. 
Studies trying to identify early warning indicators for banking crises have been carried out by 
Hardy and Pazabasioglu (1998) as well as Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). 
The methodology of these approaches is relatively uniform. For ease of exposition we will 
concentrate on the analysis of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 1996) and Kruger, 
Osakwe and Page ( 1998). Both analyzed which macroeconomic variables could be 
consistently linked to speculative attacks and whether after controlling for these influences, 
spillover effects are found to play a significant role in currency crises. 
In both studies a crisis is identified with the help of the index for exchange market pressure, 
which evaluates changes in international reserves, the exchange rate and in interest rates. With 
the help of this index Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz identified during the period from 1959 
until 1973 a total of 77 crises and 1179 periods of tranquility for their sample. 
Concerning the variables Kruger, Osakwe and Page tested the behavior of the following 
indicators: a) ratio of foreign debts to GDP, b) international reserves, c) ratio of broad money 
to international reserves, d) real exchange rate, e)growth rate of domestic credit, f) inflation, g) 
ratio of budget deficit to GDP, h) claims of banks on the private sector, i) growth rate of GDP 
per capita and j) foreign interest rates. 
Using a logit or probit model the hypothesis is tested that concurrent balance of payment crises 
in other parts of the world do not affect the likelihood of a crisis breaking out domestically. To 
this end the dependent variables are linked with the control variables via a maximum-likelihood 
estimate. Usually lagged variables are used under the assumption that a worsening of the 
fundamentals will take some time to feed itself through the system and culminate in a crisis. 
Additionally when using non-lagged variables it is hard to decide on the causality, i.e. whether 
the worsening fundamentals were responsible for the outbreak of the crisis or vice versa. 
The main advantage of the probability approach lies in the fact that all information concerning 
the potential outbreak of a crisis is summarized in one number. Further, it allows to evaluate all 
variables simultaneously. But both strengths are likewise weaknesses. A main hindrance is the 
impossibility to rank the indicators according to their relative goodness in predicting  crises. 
Under the probability approach a variable is either significant or not. While helpful in identifying 
highly explanatory variables, no information relating to the relative strength of a variable - i.e. 
to predict a large number of crises but to avoid emitting signals of crisis at non-crisis times - 
can be given. Similarly, from this analysis it is difficult to draw conclusions as to what went 
wrong in the macroeconomic sphere and where to correct economic policy in order to remedy 




be helpful for policy assessment. Lastly and related the probability approach is usually 
concerned with explaining crises that have happened. While JP Morgan undertakes out of 
sample predictions, these are of a short term nature, as with rising time horizon the predictive 
power is lost quickly. This restricts the usefulness of the probability approach for economic 
policy purposes, which needs to be able to implement measures - which only work with a 
certain time lag - in order to prevent a possible crisis. 
2.3  The Signals approach 
A different method that tries to overcome most of the above problems inherent in the 
probability approach is represented by the signal approach, which was formulated by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) as an alternative to identify early warning indicators for balance 
of payments and banking crises.3 Other studies that have used this approach are Goldstein 
(1997), Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) and Kaminsky (1998). 
The basic idea behind the signal approach is that currency crises usually do not just happen, 
i.e. that pure self fulfilling attacks are rare, but that most crises are preceded by deteriorations 
in the economic fundamentals of an economy. While the approach does not claim to be able to 
accurately predict the outbreak of the next crises, it attempts to help in the construction of a 
warning system, which monitors the evolution of several variables over time. By identifying the 
relevant early warning indicators, deeper understanding of the precise macroeconomic forces 
that have driven the economy into the crisis can be gained. Furthermore, it is in principle 
possible to perform out of sample estimates about which countries are presently particularly 
prone to crisis. 
To avoid duplication a more detailed description of the functioning of the signals approach is 
undertaken in the following section, which tries to determine whether a set of early warning 
indicators can be found that explain the experiences of the transition countries. 
3.  Applying the signals approach to Central and Eastern Europe 
3.1  Size and scope of the sample 
We study the evolution of five transition countries between 1991 and 1998. The countries in 
question are: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Russia and Bulgaria. The choice was 
dictated by the fact that each of them had experienced severe difficulties in the balance of 
payments and in the banking sector as well as by data availability. For both balance of 
payments and banking crises we focused on events – i.e. banking or balance of payments 
disruptions that would allow us enough data observations for a meaningful analysis - rather 
than employ the exchange market pressure index for currency crises.4 Following Kaminsky 
                                                 
3  The idea behind the approach is not new however, but stems basically from the literature of trying to 
identify business cycles turning points. 
4  Not always to obtain time series covering the whole spectrum. Thus we did not include the Russian and 




(1998) our definition of banking crises is composed of two aspects, which arise from the fact 
that banking crises last longer and usually start earlier than currency crises. First, the start of a 
banking crisis is signaled either by a bank run, closures, mergers or a sizeable government 
assistance package and second the height of the banking crisis is assumed to happen 
considerably later. 
This approach left us with the following events marking the beginning of a banking and/or 
currency crisis:5 
• Czech Republic  
•  Banking: August 1996, closure of Kreditni banka the sixth largest Czech 
Bank. Subsequently Agrobanka, the fifth largest bank was placed under 
forced administration and six smaller banks were closed. 
•  Balance of payments: May 1997, after ten days of speculative attacks the 
fixed exchange rate regime is abandoned and the koruna left to float. 
• Russia 
•  Banking and balance of payments: August 1998, forced devaluation of the 
rouble, switch to a flexible exchange rate regime.  A mounting interest 
burden due to several interest rate hikes and ensuing problems in rolling 
over short-term debt put the banking system in distress, with several 
closures in the following months. 
• Bulgaria 
•  Banking: March 1996, collapse of agricultural bank, starts a process that 
eventually wipes out half of the Bulgarian banks. 
•  Balance of payment: January 1997, introduction of currency board after 
hyperinflation. 
• Hungary 
•  Banking: December 1993, net income before taxes of the banking sector 
turns negative to 5,2 percent of total assets. Bad debts rise to 18 percent 
of total loans. 
•  Balance of Payments: December 1994, introduction of austerity package 
after current deficit has swollen to 9,4 percent of GDP. 
• Romania 
•  Banking: December 1996, bad debts reach 39 percent of total loans. This 
figures rises to 57 percent end of 1997. 
•  Balance of payments: January 1997, the lei devalues 20 percent in the 
space of one week. 
We study the evolution of 16 economic and financial variables6. The variables are mostly given 
in annual growth rates and on a monthly basis. An exception are the interest rate variables, 
                                                                                                                                               
that did cover the whole range were corrected for this fact in order to avoid a misinterpretation of the 
signals. Of course, this reduced the number of available observations. 




which are in levels. Below the variables are grouped in different categories. The plus or minus 
signs behind the variable name indicates the direction of the pre-crisis behavior a variable is 
assumed to exhibit. A brief summary of the economic rationale and stylized facts about their 
behavior in previous financial crises is given below:7 
a)  Fiscal Policy 
•  Ratio of government deficit to nominal GDP (+) 
This indicator corresponds to the classic Krugman-type explanation for currency 
crises. One would expect a steady rise before the eruption of a balance of payments 
crisis, while a priori there must not be a particular trend before a banking crisis. 
Afterwards an increase is to be expected due to the clean-up costs in the banking 
sector. 
                                                                                                                                               
6  The data is taken from the national statistics of the individual countries, the BIS and from the database 
of the Vienna Institute for Comparative International Economic Studies. 





b)  Monetary Policy 
•  M2 multiplier (+) 
Both banking and currency crises have been found to correlate closely with the 
emergence and rise of  the domestic banking sector that accompanies financial 
liberalization. This usually entails e.g. reduction in the reserve requirements and thus a 
subsequent rise in the multiplier. 
•  Ratio of domestic credit to nominal GDP (+) 
Again in the time leading to the two crises rapid credit expansion has been observed. 
The main reason for this lies in lending booms that can follow financial deregulation and 
the dismantling of capital controls or cyclical overheating. After the outbreak of a 
currency crisis a severe contraction of credit can be expected as banks are more 
judicious as the loan portfolio has  deteriorated. Slowing economic activity and 
worsening portfolios. 
c)  Bank Runs 
•  Bank deposits (-) 
Here we would expect a sharp drop before a banking crisis, as domestic residents 
who are better informed than foreigners slowly loose their faith in the banking systems 
ability to function efficiently. No particular reaction to currency crises is anticipated. 
d)  Current Account 
•  Exports (-) 
Currency crises are closely linked to overvalued real exchange rates. Thus exports are 
expected to be depressed ahead of a crisis. Weak exports also add pressure on the 
banking sector as the reduced competitiveness will make business failures more likely 
and thus worsen the loan portfolio of the banking system. 
•  Imports (+) 
The picture is less clear for imports, as the appreciation of the domestic currency 
should in principle foster imports. Should a weak export performance be also 
associated with lessening growth, negative income effects will compress import 
demand. 
•  Real exchange rate (-) 
A financial crisis will go hand in hand with large appreciation of the real exchange rate 
from its trend value, worsening the competitiveness and increasing the interest burden 




e)  Capital Account 
•  International reserves in US Dollars (-) 
The traditional measure of adequacy of foreign reserves to pay for imports. Reserves 
are expected to fall before a currency crises as they are spend on the defense of the 
exchange rate. A decrease can likewise be expected during banking crises. 
•  Ratio of M2 to reserves (+) 
This ratio is expected to increase as M2 will rise and reserves will fall before financial 
crises as domestic residents start converting domestic money into foreign exchange. 
•  Real interest rate differential (+) 
Real domestic interest rates will increase in banking crises as banks try to recapitalize 
themselves over a larger intermediation spreads. Also a sharp upswing is to be 
expected at the time of the currency crisis, as interest rates are used to stem capital 
outflows and for some time afterwards to prop up the new exchange rate. 
•  Foreign debt (+) 
Large foreign debts can turn the market sentiment against a country as it might be 
perceived to be unsustainable. 
•  Capital flight (+) 
The effects of capital flight are closely linked to shrinking bank deposits, as domestic 
residents will be the first to anticipate the crisis. Increasing capital flight can trigger a 
currency crises, which in turns may deepen an existing banking crisis. 
•  Short term foreign debt (+) 
An increase in short term foreign debt can be due to growing difficulties in rolling over 
foreign debt and the inability to obtain longer maturities due to the increased risk. This 
increases the susceptibility to financial crises, should the currency devalue, higher 
interest payments will increase the amount of domestic non-performing loans and the 
interest payments of the banking sector abroad. 
f)  Growth 
•  Output (-) 
An overvalued exchange rate and  the slowdown in exports will be reflected in a 
weakening economic activity both before balance of payments crises and banking 
crises. While the influence is quite direct for currency crises, the channel for banking 
crises runs from the overvalued exchange rate to sinking profit margins that cause the 
loan portfolio to worsen. 
•  Domestic real interest rate (+) 
High domestic interest rates may signal liquidity problems that in turn could cause 




•  Ratio of lending to deposit rates (+) 
The lead is historically taken here by the evolving banking crisis, as this variables 
captures a decreasing loan quality. With worsening credit portfolios, banks will 
become more hesitant to lend due to the associated adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. 
To determine whether the signal of a certain indicator heralds a crisis looming or whether it 
promises more settled times, it is necessary to determine a threshold value, which serves as a 
critical cutoff value that is the borderline between a sustainable and non-sustainable 
development. To find this critical threshold a balance has to be struck between setting it too 
high (should upward deviations indicate a worsening development) and thus potentially not 
classifying signals as worrying even though a crisis follows, or on the other hand to make the 
opposite mistake of  setting the threshold not high enough, so that any slight deviation is 
considered a crisis signal, while the economy calmly trods on. 
To solve the problem we followed Kaminsky and Reinhard (1996). For any indicator all 
observations from all countries were pooled. Iteratively this distribution was tested at varying 
cut-off points. For each cut-off point it is possible to compute a noise-to-signal ratio which is 
simply the ratio of bad signals to good signals. A bad signal is given when a signal is issued in 
non-crisis times or when no signal is issued during a crisis timeframe. A good signal 
conversely, remain silent in non-crisis periods and is observed prior to the outbreak of a crisis. 
For each indicator the cut-off value was selected that minimized the noise-to-signal ratio. Once 
having found the optimal cut-off point for all observations regarding a certain indicator, this 
value was applied to the individual distributions of that variable of a given country to determine 
the country specific threshold. If for example the value that minimized the noise-to signal ratio 
for all observations of current account deficits of the differing countries lay at 12 % , then all 
values greater than the value at the 12 % threshold were taken as a signal. Naturally, as the 
individual distributions between the countries differ, this produces very different results. To 
stick with the example, a current account deficit of 4 % might be troublesome in the Czech 
Republic but it might not be any problem at all for Hungary. 
To differentiate between the signals and their “goodness” a time frame has to be defined within 
which the signals are evaluated. Due to the relatively short time period available for the 
transition countries an 18 month window was selected.8 Specifically, for currency crises a 
signal emitted within 18 months prior to the outbreak of a crisis constitutes a good signal. A 
signal emitted before that date is correspondingly a bad signal. For banking crises the time 
frame was adjusted somewhat to take into account the different time structure of banking 
crises. Here the endpoint of the analysis is not the outbreak of the crisis, but several months 
afterwards in order to be able to take the worsening of the banking systems position into 
account. A signal is  thus considered “good “ if it was emitted in the 9 months preceding the 
crises or in the 9 months following the crises. 
                                                 




To judge how effective an individual indicator is, it useful to consider the following matrix. 
  crisis  no crisis 
signal send  A  B 
no signal send  C  D 
Source: Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997). 
with : 
  A – number of months a god signal was send 
  B – number of months a bad signal was send 
  C – number of months no signal was send but a crisis followed 
  D – number of months no signal was send and no crisis followed 
A good indicator will send primarily signals belonging in the quadrants A and D. To compute 
the noise-to signal ratio as an indicator of the quality of the individual early warning indicator 
one simply divides the tendency to send bad signals, i.e. the number of months where a bad 
signal was send divided by the number of months a bad signal could have been emitted (B / 
B+D) by the tendency to emit good signals (A / A+C). Defined like this values close to zero 
indicate that a variable is of high quality in predicting a crisis. If an indicator does not possess 
any information, i.e. if the signals it sends are arbitrary, it will take on the value 1. Indicators 
that show values of greater than 1 actually worsen the analysis and should be dropped from 
the list of indicators used for checking a country’s vulnerability to either a currency crisis or an 
banking crisis. 
3.2  The main results 
Table (1) gives an overview over the performance of individual indicators in forecasting 
currency and banking crisis. For each indicator and type of crisis, the first column gives the 
critical region, which is the percentage of observations that are identified as signaling crises, the 
next two columns show the size of type I and type II errors, respectively, and the last column 
gives the a noise-to-signal ratio. 
Table 1: 




























Fiscal Policy                 
Gov. 
Deficit/GDP  18  62  5  0.13  13  71  9  0.30 
Monetary 
Policy                 
M2 Multiplier  32  67  31  0.94  29  67  23  0.69 
Dom. Credit/ 
GDP  14  77  8  0.36  10  81  6  0.30 
Bank Runs                 
Bank Deposits  8  84  4  0.25  16  39  7  0.12 
Current 
Account                 
Exports  10  80  2  0.12  7  85  4  0.24 
Imports  18  88  21  1.70  32  86  39  2.77 
Real Exchange 
Rate  28  48  19  0.37  7  89  6  0.53 
Capital Account                 
Reserves  18  72  9  0.31  7  78  5  0.24 
M2/Reserves  9  88  4  0.33  26  50  18  0.35 
Real Interest 
Rate Diff.  7  93  7  1.05  9  63  5  0.14 
World Real 
Interest Rate  28  74  28  1.08  6  98  7  4.80 
Foreign Debt  7  91  6  0.63  7  81  6  0.33 
Capital Flight  12  90  13  1.26  6  92  8  0.95 
Short-term 
Foreign Debt  10  82  4  0.24  9  71  5  0.16 
Growth                 
Output  28  64  24  0.69  18  54  13  0.28 
Domestic Real 
Interest Rate  6  92  5  0.60  28  67  27  0.80 
Lending/Deposit 
RateRatio  8  82  2  0.13  9  76  6  0.25 
Like the findings of Kaminsky/Reinhart and Kaminsky (1998) the forecasting ability of the 
different indicators of our analysis vary widely. One of the best indicators are exports with a 
noise-to-signal ratio equal to 0.12 for currency crises and equal 0.24 for banking crises. The 
worst indicator are imports with a noise-to-signal ratio far greater than one; 1.7 for currency 
crises and 2.8 for banking crises - meaning that the indicator issues either false alarms or sends 
no signals at all. In sum, only five out of the eighteen indicators considered here should not be 
used for forecasting these types of crises. 
Contrary to Kaminsky‘s findings, the world interest rate does not accentuate the vulnerability 
of the economies by triggering speculative attacks against the domestic currencies. The noise-
to-signal ratio of this indicator is 1.1. An important result of Kaminsky’s study (1998) is that 
the onset of a currency crisis is characterized by the coexistence of inverse capital flows. Her 
analysis suggests that during the period prior to the outbreak of a currency crisis, increasing 




the Central and East European countries – with a noise-to-signal ratio well below one for 
foreign debt and greater than one for capital flight. However, just like for the Asian crisis, 
liquidity problems have also been important during the East European currency crises. 
Liquidity problems are captured by the ratio of foreign debt with a one-year maturity or less to 
total foreign debt. Here the noise-to-signal ratio is 0.24. 
Surprisingly, bank runs are an excellent predictor of banking crises. This result has not been 
found in previous studies for other countries. Apparently, the implicit and explicit deposit 
insurance guarantees are not very credible in the Central and East European countries. This 
result is even reinforced if domestic residents‘ assets overseas (capital flight) - with BIS 
reporting banks – is taken into account with a noise-to-signal ratio of below one (0.95) but 
greater than one for currency crises (1.26). 
It is harder to anticipate banking crises than speculative attacks against the domestic currency. 
The average noise-to-signal ratio for all indicators is 0.75 for banking crises and 0.59 for 
currency crises. This confirms basically the findings of Kaminsky (1998) also for the Central 
and East European countries. However, in our analysis the bad average performance of the 
indicators in the case of banking crises is only due to the exceptionally bad forecasting abilities 
of two indicators; namely, imports with a noise-to-signal ratio of 2.8 and the world interest 
rate (4.8). All other indicators have noise-to-signal ratios below one. So, looking at the 
median of the noise-to-signal ratios of all indicators the performance in the case of banking 
crises is much better than in the case of currency crises. The median for currency crises and 
banking crises are 0.49 and 0.30, respectively. Some indicators are considerably more 
accurate in anticipating banking crises than currency crises. This is – like in Kaminsky‘s 
analysis- the case for indicators related to the domestic financial sector. In particular, the 
indicators that capture the boom-bust credit cycle: M2 multiplier and domestic credit/GDP. 
3.3  A closer look at the individual countries 
This section will take a look to see how the indicators fared in the individual crisis the countries 
and - except for Russia since its crisis is too recent - whether the indicators have emitted 
signals in concentrated form lately in order to gauge the soundness of recent economic 
developments. These comments should not be mistaken for a prognosis, rather they serve to 
highlight areas that could be but need not be of concern. The results of how the indicators 
performed regarding the actual crises are given in Table 2, with a plus or double plus indicating 
good explanatory power, 0 that no real inference could be made and a minus or double minus 
that the given indicator did not perform well. 
The lead up to the Czech currency crisis was marked by an increasing number of indicators 
sending signals of distress. 82 percent of all indicators send signals at different points in time in 
the 18 months preceding the crises. Characteristic for the Czech case is a marked 
deterioration of most variables in this time period, without however always reaching the 
threshold. Consequently a staunching of signals only occurred in the last half year prior to the 
crisis with about 40 percent sending simultaneously 6 months ahead and 56 percent of all 




domestic real interest rate and capital flight did not send any signals at all or did not convey 
any information about the impeding crisis. The evidence thus points overwhelmingly to a crisis 
that was caused by deteriorating fundamentals and not as sometimes asserted by contagion 
from East Asia. Since the crisis the economic performance as indicated by the variables has 
increased considerably with most indicators far from their threshold values. Exceptions are the 
banking deposits which have remained in the signal region, causing concern about the banking 
sector; the real exchange rate, showing that the koruna has become overvalued again and the 
government deficit which has lately started to emit signals again. Cause for concern are also 
the poor output figures realized in the last two quarter of 1998, which were not among the 
data set which we tested. All in all though the Czech Republic has mastered the crisis on the 
balance of payments front. The situation – as portrayed by the evolution of the indicators - is 
similarly stable for the banking sector. In light of the continuing problems with non-performing 
loans this comes as small surprise. 
In Bulgaria the behavior of the indicators is influenced by the hyperinflation that preceded the 
introduction of the currency board. This affected the performance of certain indicators such as 
the real interest differential. On the whole, the performance of the indicators is weaker than for 
the Czech Republic with less indicators continuously rising above or below their respective 
thresholds. The best performing indicators were the ratio of the budget deficit to GDP, the 
growth rate of domestic credit and the changes in foreign exchange reserves. Like in the Czech 
Republic a deterioration could be observed over prolonged periods of time in almost all 
indicators, even if they did no always cross the threshold levels. Unlike the Czech Republic 
exports and the real exchange rate were not among the stronger indicators an variables related 
to the financial sector did  mostly better than those that can be grouped to the current account. 
Again no information could be gained from imports, the domestic real interest rate capital flight 
and the changes in foreign debt. Considerably more variables have started or continued to give 
signals after the end of the crisis than was the case for the Czech Republic with most of the 
variables only starting quite recently. The deterioration of export growth, output, and the rise in 
the spread between lending and deposit rates combined with a simultaneous expansion of 
domestic credit growth are particularly noteworthy, as each belonged to the better performing 





Summary of Results 
Country  Bulgaria  Czech Rep.  Hungary  Romania  Russia 
Indicator           
Fiscal Policy           
Gov. eficit/GDP  ++  +  +  ++  ++ 
Monetary Policy           
M2 Multiplier  0  +  0  +  + 
Dom. Credit/ GDP  +  0  +  -  + 
Bank Runs           
Bank Deposits  +  +  +  -  0 
Current Account           
Exports  0  +  -  +  + 
Imports  --  --  0  0  0 
Real Exchange Rate  +  +  +  +  ++ 
Capital Account           
Reserves  +  +  -  -  + 
M2/Reserves  0  +  --  n.a.  + 
Real Interest Rate Diff.  -  0  +  --  -- 
World Real Interest Rate           
Foreign Debt  --  --  +  0  + 
Capital Flight  --  0  --  --  0 
Short-term Foreign Debt  ++  0  +  0  0 
Growth           
Output  +  ++  -  ++  -- 
Domestic Real Interest Rate  0  -  --  0  -- 
Lending/Deposit Rate Ratio  +  +  0  --  + 
Hungary is after Romania the country with the least number of indicators issuing signals that 
indicated the outbreak of a crisis. Particularly interesting is the lack of influence of exports and 
only a subdued positive explanatory power of the real exchange rate. At the same time imports 
seemed to have played a role. This suggests that the ballooning current account deficit was 
driven by other forces than the current deficits experienced by other transition countries. Well 
on the other hand, performed the growth rate of domestic credit, the ratio of short term foreign 
debt to total foreign debt and to lesser degrees the real interest rate differential and bank 
deposits. Together these serve as an indication of sizable problems in the Hungarian banking 
sector, which at that time was severely undercapitalized and possessed a loan portfolio of 
poor quality. From the indicators that have given signals since the crisis have been overcome 
the real interest differential stands out as being steadily above the threshold since the time of 
the crisis. Yet, this does not indicate major problems down the road, as the ratio is well below 
that of other transition economies and Hungary has like other transition economies large capital 




months, here more caution is called for as this could indicate the beginnings of a boom-bust 
cycle. 
Romania is interesting insofar as it is the only country in the sample that has not fixed its 
exchange against another currency but rather has opted for a flexible exchange rate regime. It 
is also remarkable that only f ive out of the 16 indicators possess substantial explanatory 
power, the least number observed for a country in our sample. Yet, these proved themselves 
to be persistent in their emission of warning signs, with industrial output starting to send signals 
as early as 12 months prior to the outbreak of the currency crisis. Also of value were the 
deficit / GDP ratio, exports, the real exchange rate and the M2 multiplier. Unlike in other 
countries these were also exactly the same indicators that have signaled potential problems 
since the crisis. Even though he signals were not as intense as in the second half of 1996, 
clearly Romania could be heading for trouble again. 
Finally, turning to the latest casualty of international financial markets in Central and Eastern 
Europe – Russia - the picture that emerges is similar to that of the Czech Republic.  Nine 
indicators show good explanatory power, indicating that the crisis was certainly home made 
and not the result of Asian contagion.  Especially well proved to be the real exchange rate, the 
deficit ratio, exports and domestic credit, as well as reserves and the ratio of M2 to reserves. 
All this mirrors the state of the Russian economy in the first nine months of 1998 rather well, 
with a sizable overvaluation of the rouble, a government deficit that could not be brought under 
control and dwindling reserves. Poor performance showed the growth indicators with the 
exception of the lending/ deposit rate, which had a mildly positive information impact. 
4.  Concluding remarks 
The results of our empirical analysis are encouraging, since we were able to replicate the 
results of previous studies. It shows that the transformation countries – despite having special 
features – already share many common features with other countries. The main conclusion of 
our study selected Central and East European countries is that the crises that have taken place 
are baiscally homemade and not due to contagion effects. 
The signal approach has certainly its limitations. Our sample consists only of five countries, 
thus, the results can be strongly influenced by outliers. which was apparent in some of the 
indicators. Furthermore, the country sample is quite heterogenous. And the classification of 
crises into pure currency or a pure banking crisis is frought with difficulties. While the Russian 
crisis contained strong elements of both, the Czech case was more representative of a 
currency crisis, and the Hungarian crisis leaned more towards a banking crisis. 
Nonetheless, the signals approach certainly has its merits as a tool to assess the evolution of 
economic fundamentals within a particular country or region and to heighten the awareness of 
policymakers for potential imbalances. Due to the early warning character of the approach it 
provides policymakers with timely and ample opportunity to change course and to prevent 




misleading since crises usually exhibit individual characteristics that reflect special features 
germane to a country’s history and unique economic circumstances prevailing at that moment. 
It is to be expected that the next crisis will contain new relevant factors which previously our 
profession had not considered. Still, while being imperfect in this sense the signals approach 
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